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CaseNo.20070291-CA
IN THE

UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Bridget Marie Hughes,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of marijuana, a class B
misdemeanor; and possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony. This
Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court properly rule that the street-side encounter between
defendant, her two male companions, and police officers was voluntary and that
defendant and her cohorts consented to be searched for weapons?
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.
State v. KrukowsU, 2004 UT 94, % 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal

conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application
of the legal standards to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <f 11,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONST.

Amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(l) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2006), and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). Rl.
Motion to suppress denied. The trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress the drug evidence. Rl71:57-59 (a copy of the oral ruling is attached in the
addendum). The trial court found that defendant's street-side encounter with
officers in this case was voluntary, and that she and her two male companions
consented to the weapons frisks that led to the discovery of drugs on defendant and
one of her male cohorts. Id. The trial court expressly rejected defendant's assertion

2

that Officer Butcher's request for identification constituted a show of authority.
R171:58. Finally, the trial found that there were no indicia of seizure:
It could be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching or the person, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled. I didn't see that in any of the
evidence before me.

Id. (emphasis added).
Conviction. A jury convicted defendant on both counts. R66. The trial court
imposed the statutory indeterminate term of zero-to-five years for the felony
offense, and a 180-day jail term for the misdemeanor offense. R131-32. The trial
court then suspended the prison term and placed defendant on 30-days home
confinement and a 36-month term of probation. R132-33.
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R149-50
and 140-41.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Defendant volunteered that she had marijuana in her upper coat pocket
during a consensual weapons frisk R172:99; R171:41. Police officers thereafter
discovered she had an outstanding warrant

R171:30; R172:79. A search of

defendant's person incident to her arrest led to the additional discovery of
methamphetamine. R171:31; R172:81-82.
At approximately 1:00 a.m., on 9 April 2006, Officer Butcher of the Davis
County Sheriff's Department had just completed an arrest near the intersection of
Avalon and Merlin in Layton, when he saw three young-looking people standing in
the intersection. R171:25-26,33-34; R172:68,70; see also id. at 72 ("This is kind of a
high crime area in the Layton area").2 As he drove though the intersection, the three

1

The facts are gleaned from both the pretrial suppression hearing (R171) and
the jury trial (R172), and are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmyer, 947P.2d 1157,1158
(Utah App. 1997). Appellate courts that consider both pretrial and trial evidence in
reviewing a pretrial ruling generally do so only in the context of affirming the
pretrial ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Moron, 503 F.3d 1135,1139 (10th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 R3d 611,615 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Basey, 816 F.2d 980,983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); Green v. State, 637 S.E.2d 498,499 (Ga.
App. 2006); State v. Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra Brye v.
State, 927 So.2d 78,80 (Fla. App. 2006) (reversal).
2

While Officer Butcher specifically testified that the intersection of Avalon
and Merlin is a high crime area, the prosecutor opined that it was "not considered to
be a high drug trafficking area." R35.
4

young people were facing each other, and two of them conducted a hand-to-hand
exchange- R171:25,34,36-37; R172:72. Specifically, Officer Butcher saw that''one
thing was handed to an individual and they handed something back to them."
R172:72. When they became aware of the officer, the trio moved toward the
sidewalk and "started to walk away from [him] up the street." R171:26,35. During
his sixteen years in law enforcement, Officer Butcher has observed similar hand-tohand exchanges and associates them with drug transactions. R172:69,72. He also
suspected the three young-looking people were under eighteen years of age and
were thus in violation of the 11:00 p.m. curfew. R171:37-38.
Officer Butcher pulled over and asked the three to "come back," and they
complied. R172:26;R172:73. As they approached the officer, the trio stated that they
were walking home. R171:26; R172:73. Officer Butcher asked them if they had
identification and none of them did. R171:26; R172:73. He then asked for their
names and dates of birth, which they provided. R171:26. Defendant's information
indicated that she was twenty-six years old, and her two male companions provided
information indicating that they were twenty-four and twenty-two years old.
R171:38. Before running computer checks to verify the information, Officer Butcher
asked the trio if they had any weapons on them. R171:27,38;R172:73-74. Defendant
immediately produced a small wooden bat from inside her coat sleeve, but denied
5

having any other weapons, as did her two male cohorts. R171:27, 29; R172:74.
Officer Butcher asked for permission to check each of them for additional weapons
and was told "it was okay to go ahead/ 7 R171:27; R172:74.
Officer Butcher began with one of the young men, locating a knife. R171:27;
R172:74. While removing the knife, Officer Butcher additionally discovered a baggy
filled with what appeared to be marijuana and some finger scales. R171:27-28;
R172:76. Officer Butcher placed the young man in custody and called for backup.
R171:28-29;R172:77.
When Officer Hawkins responded, Officer Butcher told him about
defendant's wooden bat, and the knife and drugs he had located on one of her male
cohorts. R171:43. Because Officer Butcher had just discovered a knife and drugs on
one of the three companions, and because Officer Butcher was then dealing with the
two males, Officer Hawkins asked defendant if he could frisk her for weapons,
including her pockets. R171:29,41,43,47. Defendant initially refused to consent to
the weapons search because Officer Hawkins was male. R171:44. Once Officer
Hawkins explained that "it wasn't going to be that thorough of a search," defendant
consented to be searched, including her pockets. R171:41,47-48; R172:99. When
Officer Hawkins "started to go onto to the top upper pockets" of defendant's coat,
"she said right then she had some marijuana that was her boyfriend's that was in
6

the coat/' Rl 71:30,41; R172:99. Officer Hawkins retrieved the marijuana and placed
defendant in custody. R171:30,41; R172:99.
After defendant was taken into custody, Officer Butcher ran a warrants check
and found that she had an outstanding arrest warrant. R171:30;R172:79. Defendant
was arrested and during an incident search of her person at the jail, officers
additionally discovered methamphetamine. R171:31; R172:81-82.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court found that the encounter between defendant, her two male
cohorts, and Officers Butcher and Hawkins was voluntary, and that defendant and
her cohorts consented to the weapons frisks that yielded drugs. Defendant does not
dispute that the initial encounter was voluntary, or that the officer's request for their
identification did not escalate the encounter. Defendant does assert, however, that
the encounter escalated to an involuntary detention around the time the officer
asked the trio if they had any weapons. But defendant fails to marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's factual findings, including that she consented to the
weapons frisk of her person that yielded marijuana—and she is thus bound by
them. Defendant's claim is also inadequately preserved because she never asserted
in the trial court that an objectively reasonably person would not have felt free to
request the return of the wooden bat she volunteered to Officer Butcher.
7

In any event, the trial court's ruling may also be affirmed on the alternative
ground that the officers acted with reasonable suspicion of curfew and drug
violations from the outset of the encounter. Therefore, even assuming arguendo
that defendant was detained here, the detention was justified.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE STREETSIDE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN DEFENDANT, HER TWO
MALE COHORTS, AND POLICE OFFICERS WAS
VOLUNTARY AND THAT DEFENDANT AND HER
COHORTS CONSENTED TO THE WEAPONS FRISKS THAT
YIELDED DRUGS
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure"
requiring justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242,
1244 (Utah 1994) {citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). Indeed, Utah
recognizes three levels of police-citizen contacts, two of which are at issue here: a
level one voluntary encounter requiring no justification and a level two temporary
seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.3 State v. Adams, 2007 UT App 117, \ 9,158
P.3d 1134 (citing State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,110 n.l, 112 P.3d 507); see also State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d 984,986 (Utah App. 1994).
3

The third level of police citizen encounter, arrest, must be supported by
probable cause, see State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,617-18 (Utah 1987), but is not at
issue.
8

Here, the trial court ruled that the encounter between defendant, her two
male cohorts, and officers Hawkins and Butcher was a level one voluntary
encounter. See R171:57-59. Defendant acknowledges that the street-side encounter
began as a voluntary contact Aplt. Br. at 14 (Deputy Butcher's initial request for
identification alone did not constitute a level two stop"). But defendant contends
that it escalated to a level two detention about the time that Officer Butcher asked
the trio if they had any weapons. See Aplt. Br. At 14-16. Defendant bases her claim
on the officers' alleged "accusatory tone of voice and language, retention of
property, pat down, and custody of her male companion." Aplt. Br. at 16.
Defendant's claim fails because it is inadequately briefed, and because defendant
has neither marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, nor
adequately preserved her claim of error.

9

The Fourth Amendment standard.4

As noted, a level one voluntary

encoimter requires no Fourth Amendment justification. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. A
voluntary encoimter occurs when an officer approaches and questions an individual
in a public place. Deitman, 739 R2d at 617; B^n,869P.2dat986. See alsoBostick, 501
U.S. at 434 ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions"). "Since a
consensual encoimter is not a seizure, questioning during such an encounter is
lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person remains a willing participant/ 7
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 37, 63 P.3d 650. Questioning may thus be
incriminating and may also include a request for identification and for consent to
search the individual's personal items. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435,439. An officer may
approach and so question any individual at any time so long as a "reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the

4

Although defendant cites to both the state and federal constitutions in his
brief, he engages in no analysis of the state constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 2,9-12. His
reliance on the state constitution is therefore nominal. See Brigham City v. Stuart,
2005 UT 13, f 14,122 P.3d 506 (Utah 2005) ("[W]e are resolute in our refusal to take
up constitutional issues which have not bee properly framed, and briefed"),
overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1248 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed.").
10

encounter/' United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the "[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes [only] unreasonable searches and
seizures[,]... not [] voluntary cooperation." Bostick, 501U .S. at 439.
As further noted, the second level of police-citizen encounter is a temporary
seizure requiring Fourth Amendment justification. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 6Y7yAdams,
2007 UT App 117,110; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. In order to legally effect a level two
seizure, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed or
is about to commit a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. Bean, 869
P.2d at 986. "A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when, considering
the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her business." Higgins, 884
P.2d at 1244; accord Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202. Circumstances indicative of a seizure
include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554 (1980).
Here, as noted, defendant acquiesces in the trial court's ruling that the streetside encounter with Officer Butcher began as a level one voluntary contact. Aplt. Br.
11

at 14 ("Deputy Butcher's initial request for identification alone did not constitute a
level two stop"). However, defendant asserts that the voluntary encounter escalated
to a level two detention somewhere around the time that Officer Butcher asked
whether she and her two male cohorts had any weapons—and defendant handed
over the small wooden bat hidden inside her coat sleeve. See Aplt. Br. at 14-16.
According to defendant, "a reasonable person in [defendant's] position would not
feel free to just walk away by abandoning her [wooden bat], let alone approaching
Deputy Butcher to take back [the wooden bat] and leave." Id. In support, defendant
further asserts that Deputy Butcher used an "accusatory tone of voice and language,
regained her wooden bat],"and that she was "pat[ted] down," and one of her male
cohorts was taken into custody. Aplt. Br. at 16.
Failure to marshal. The trial court found that this was a consensual
encounter, including the frisk of defendant's person that yielded drugs. See
R17157-59. Defendant fails to properly challenge the trial court's factual findings.
Defendant asserts that she did not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter
because Deputy Butcher allegedly used an "accusatory tone of voice and language,"
but the trial court disagreed. The trial court expressly found no indicia of seizure on
these facts, and specifically found that the deputy did not use "language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."
12

R171:58. Moreover, defendant's claim that she did not feel free to leave or to
terminate the encounter because she was patted down, contradicts the trial court's
findings. The trial court expressly found that defendant and her male cohorts all
agreed to be searched for weapons: "I note that the important facts here include the
fact t h a t . . . [Deputy Butcher] [a]sked if they had any weapons, they said no, and
then asked if he could check for weapons and they said yes." R17157-58. "Consent
is a factual findingf.]" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125, I 48,63 P.3d 650.
Defendant does not assert that any of the trial court's findings here are clearly
erroneous; does not cite to the "authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on," rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; does not "marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged findings," id.) and does not "ferret out [any]
fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315
(Utah App. 1991). Rather, defendant recites the facts in the light least favorable to
the trial court's ruling. Aplt Br. at 15-16. Having thus failed to properly challenge
the trial court's findings, defendant is bound by them. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT
47, \ 12,164 P.3d 397 (accepting trial court's factual finding as conclusive where
Worwood "failed to actually challenge [the] finding by marshaling the evidence");
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 60,28 P.3d 1278 (noting that a party who wishes to
challenge a factual finding must first marshal the evidence in support of the finding
13

and then show why the marshaled evidence fails to support the finding). Moreover,
this Court recently refused to address any of an [appellant's] legal arguments that
[were] entirely dependent on a version of the facts that [was] contrary to the trial
court's findings." Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, \ 13,
P.3d

.

In any event, the trial court's findings that Deputy Butcher did not use an
accusatory tone or language and that defendant consented to be searched for
weapons are well supported. Indeed, Officer Butcher's and Officer Hawkins'
testimony was uncontested. Officer Butcher asked if he could check defendant and
her male cohorts for weapons and was "told it was okay to go ahead." R171:27;
R172:74. Officer Hawkins, the back-up officer who searched defendant, specifically
asked if he could search her for weapons, including her pockets. Rl 71:41, 47;
R172:98. Defendant initially declined because Officer Hawkins was male; however
once he explained that it "was not that thorough of a search," defendant gave her
consent to be searched, including her pockets. R171:41,48; R172:98-99. Given that
the trial court heard both officers' testimony and was able to assess, among other
things, their demeanor, deportment, and credibility, there is no reason to doubt the
trial court's findings that the officers did not use an accusatory tone or language in
conversing with defendant and that she and her two male cohorts consented to be
14

searched for weapons. See R171:57-59. Nothing in the record supports defense
counsel's characterization that the officers used an accusatory tone and language.
Failure to preserve. Defendant's claim is also unpreserved. Defendant claims
that she was seized because the officers retained her small wooden bat, but she
failed to present that claim in the trial court. Defendant never specifically asserted
in her motion to suppress that she was seized because an objectively reasonable
person would not have felt free to request the wooden bat. See R22-29. Rather, the
motion to suppress asserted only that defendant was seized because "she was
ordered over to the police vehicle, questioned, ID'd, frisked, and searched," absent
reasonable suspicion. R27.
Utah's contemporaneous preservation rule requires timely and specific
objections "in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give
the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate/" State v. Brown, 856
P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). Therefore, "claims of evidentiary
error are waived unless the record reflects a timely objection stating the specific
ground upon which it is based." State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1986).
Defendant does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. See
Aplt Br. at 16. Accordingly, her assertion that she was detained because the officers

15

retained her wooden bat may not now be considered. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT
4, f 23 n.6,128 P.3d 1171 (declining to infer a plain error argument).
In any event, the mere fact that the officers briefly retained the volunteered
bat until they were able to safely verify defendant's and her cohorts' information
did not escalate the encounter to a level two detention. Before attempting to verify
the trio's information, the officers expressed a desire to clear the area of weapons
and Officer Butcher asked defendant and her companions if they had any. R171:27;
R172:73-74. Defendant produced the wooden bat from inside her coat sleeve, and
the officers thereafter obtained permission to check each individual for additional
weapons. R171:27; R172:74. The brief retention of the wooden bat—and the knife
subsequently discovered on one of defendant's cohorts—until the officers could
safely verify their ages was reasonable and prudent In other words, because the
officers did not retain the weapons any longer than necessary to safely verify the
trio's information, it did not escalate the otherwise voluntary encounter to an
unlawful detention. See Adams, 2007 UT App 117,113 (holding no seizure occurred
where officer did not hold Adams' identification "any longer than was necessary" to
obtain information).
Reasonable suspicion. Finally, the trial court's ruling denying the motion to
suppress may be affirmed on the alternative ground that the officers here acted with
16

reasonable suspicion.

See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158

(recognizing that "an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its
ruling or action" (citation omitted)).
The Fourth Amendment allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer "observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonable to conclude in Ught of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30 (1968). "The officer, of course, must be
able to articulate more than an 'inchoate an unparticularized suspicion or hunch/
The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal level of objective justification' for
making the stop." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 27, and INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). A stop is justified if the
officer can identify "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts," support a reasonable suspicion that "aiminal activity
may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30; accord State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 11,999
P.3d7.
When determining the validity of a detention, the Court "must view the
articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and
17

evaluate them in isolation/' State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,f14, 78 P.3d 590; accord
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 (requiring review of "the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture"); United States v. Arivzu, 534 U.S. 266,274 (2002) (cautioning against
using "divide-and-conquer" approach, or against considering facts in isolation and
discounting any fact "that [is] by itself readily susceptible to an innocent
explanation"). Moreover, the facts must "be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure... 'warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the [seizure] was appropriate?" Terry,
392 U.S. at 21-22. This objective analysis includes consideration of "the factual
inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer" based on his or her experience
and specialized training—inferences "that 'might well elude an untrained person/"
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277,273 (citation omitted); accord Warren, 2003 UT 36,114.
"Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a
stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Accordingly, "[a] determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct." Id. at 277. Instead, courts "must... 'judge the officer's conduct in light of
common sense and ordinary human experience and . . . accord deference to an
18

officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions/" Marldand,
2005 UT 26,111 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1268 (10th Cir.
2001)). In sum, reasonable suspicion '"does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;...
[law enforcement officers] are permitted to do the same

" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8

(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)).
Here, Officer Butcher reasonably suspected from the outset of the encounter
that the young-looking trio may be in violation of the 11:00 p.m. curfew. R171:26,
37-38 ("They all appeared somewhat young to me"). See Bean, 869 P.2d 984,985,
Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding officer reasonably suspected Bean was in violation of
curfew because Bean "appeared to be very young"); see also State v. A.L., 956 So.2d
1215, 1216 (Fla. App. 2007) (holding officer reasonably suspected A.L. violated
cufew ordinance, where officer "noticed a young man, who appeared to be a
juvenile"); State v. Vaughters, 2006 WL 1360436, *3 (Ohio App. 2006) (holding officer
reasonably suspected curfew violation, where Vaughters appeared "underage"); In
re Welfare of S.D.N., 2003 WL 21061115, *3 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding officers
reasonably suspected curfew violation where they observed a "group of individuals,
who looked like juveniles and were wearing gang colors, standing at a bus shelter
19

after curfew hours and throwing garbage onto the street"). But cf. State v. Chism,
2005 UT App 41, \ 16 n.8, 107 P.3d 706 (questioning in dicta whether officer's
"subjective impression of Chism's age," amounted to reasonable suspicion of
tobacco violation).
Officer Butcher's initial reasonable suspicion of a curfew violation was only
heightened when he observed a hand-to-hand exchange between two of the trio. In
Officer's Butcher's sixteen years of law enforcement experience, similar hand-tohand exchanges have indicated a drug transaction. Rl72:69, 72. See State v.
Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \ \ 10-12,128 P.3d 28 (holding Singleton's walking
away from officer, together with hand-to-hand exchange in an area known for drug
trafficking supported reasonable suspicion); State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, \ 9,47
P.3d 932 (holding officer's observation of hand-to-hand exchange "reasonably led
him to suspect that [Beach] was distributing a controlled substance"). Moreover, the
trio began walking away upon noticing Officer Butcher's approach, which further
added to his reasonable suspicion of curfew and drug violations. R171:26,34,36-37;
R172:72. See Singleton, 2005 UT App 464,f11 (holding Singleton's "walking away
from officers" was act of evasion, reasoning "whether an individual engages in
evasive behavior does not hinge upon whether that individual attempts to flee with
great speed").
20

Upon contacting the trio and obtaining their names and ages, but before
verifying that information, Officer Butcher asked if they had any weapons. R171:2627; R172:73-74. In response, defendant produced a small wooden bat from inside
her coat sleeve. R171:27; R172:74. At this point, Officer Butcher reasonably
suspected the trio may have additional weapons, even though they denied it.
R171:27; R172:74. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160,111,47 P.3d 932 (recognizing officer
was not bound to accept Beach's innocent explanation); State v. McLean, 1999 UT
App 114, 1999 WL 33244734, *3 (unpublished) (recognizing officer "was not
required to take the word of the driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he
have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening move before he checked the
weapons to assure his own safety"). Accordingly, the officer not only asked about
additional weapons, but also asked to check each person individually for weapons.
Rl71:27; R172:74. After receiving permission to frisk one of defendant's male
cohorts, Officer Butcher located not only a second weapon or knife, but drugs as
well. Rl71:27; Rl72:75-76. Given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable
for the officers to suspect that the other two members of the trio, including
defendant, may have additional weapons and drugs on their persons.
Indeed, the trio were clearly associated with one another. Upon first being
contacted by the officer they told him that they were walking home and none of the
21

three ever attempted to disassociate themselves from the other two. R171:26-27;
R721:72-75. Thus, even though they were not traveling in a "relatively small
automobile/7 an objectively reasonable person could have concluded that the three
pedestrians were "engaged in a common enterprise... and ha[d] the same interest
in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing/" Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366,373 (2003) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-05 (1999)).
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances here, Officers Butcher
and Hawkins reasonably suspected defendant may have another weapon on her
person—and drugs—at the time she consented to be patted down. They were
therefore justified in detaining her for a weapons frisk, including briefly retaining
her wooden bat

22

CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should be affirmed,
as should the jury verdict.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Okay, counsel, will you direct me?

7

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, the only other matters I'm

8

aware of that I have are 74 and 75, Bridget Hughes.

9

THE COURT: Do you folks want to make argument on

10

those?

I have had a chance to - I've reviewed the tape, I've

11

reviewed your briefings, I've read a number of cases and I'm

12

ready to make a decision but if you want more argument.

13

MR. SMITH:

I would reiterate what I briefed.

14

the Court has read the briefs —

15

THE COURT:

I did.

If

I read them and I had our law

16

clerk read them and Jessica and why don't we call those.

17

It's State of Utah vs. Bridget Marie Hughes, 031700171,

18

061700535.

19

argument.

20

again including watching the tape of the testimony.

21

that the important facts here include the fact that there

22

were three individuals, appeared young, were out at

23

approximately 1:00 in the morning, potentially in violation

24

of 11:00 p.m. curfew.

25

Apparently they started to walk away but he pulled over to

The later is the one that's set for oral
It's the new charge and I have reviewed everything
I note

The officer approached them.
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1

the side of the road and my sense is they were walking to the

2

side of the road to get out of the middle of the road, asked

3

them for their ages and identification.

4

Asked if they had any weapons, they said no, and then asked

5

if he could check for weapons and they said yes.

6

They provided that.

Subsequent to that, pursuant to the consent to

7

search, drugs were found which counsel claims should be

8

suppressed because of the fact that there was no reasonable

9

articulable suspicion.

10

My best view of this, counsel, is that this never

11

got beyond a level 1 encounter.

It's clear from reading the

12

relevant case law that request for identification, that

13

doesn't constitute a show of authority, and by the way I've

14

read State of Utah vs. Mike O'Leary Dean and also Salt Lake

15

City vs. Carolyn L. Rae. And they discuss the difference

16

between a level 1 and level 2 and that's really the critical

17

question here, in my mind at least.

18

of circumstances that might indicate a level 2 or a seizure.

19

It could be the threatening presence of several officer, the

20

display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of

21

the person, or the use of language or tone of voice

22

indicating that compliance with the officer's request might

23

be compelled.

24

before me.

25

City case I mentioned, the court indicated that request for

They discussed examples

I didn't see that in any of the evidence

It's clear in that same case, in the Salt Lake
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1

identification alone as a matter of law does not constitute a

2

show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter

3

into a seizure.

4

The search was consistent - was pursuant to consent and I

5

must deny the motion.

In my view, this never got beyond level 1.

6

Where would you like to go with this?

7

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I believe she'd like to set

THE COURT:

You bet.

8

a trial.

9
10

I'd be glad to do that.

So

will it be a one-day jury trial?

11

MR. SMITH:

I think one day should be sufficient.

12

THE COURT:

Let me grab my calendar, counsel.

13

Let's set the matter November 9th.

14

(Discussion of dates and other trials pending).

15

THE COURT: I have an opportunity of December 6th -

16

or December 7th actually.

17

any further into December.

18

don't think they like it on either side.

19

think it gives them more reason to acquit or more reason to

20

convict.

Frankly, I probably wouldn't go
Juries just don't like it.

I mean I don't

I just don't think they like it.

21

MR. SMITH:

December 7th would be fine.

22

THE COURT:

Do you want to shoot for that?

23

MR. MAJOR:

That would be fine.

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

I

Do you think I better do a

waiver of a speedy trial?
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